Interview with Toumazos Tsielepis, member of the Political Bureau of AKEL, Head of the Cyprus Problem Office of the C.C. of AKEL and International Law expert
Sunday 13 May 2018, newspaper “HARAVIGI”
“A clear statement from the President, similar to Akinci’s, is needed”
“The Turkish Cypriot leader’s statement is evidently being perceived by the United Nations as a unilateral acceptance for the continuation of the procedure, just as the Secretary-General proposes”
Toumazos Tsielepis points out the dangers arising from the prolonged deadlock on the Cyprus problem, stressing at the same time the need to return to the negotiations. To do this, however, it is necessary for the Greek Cypriot side to send out a clear message expressing its readiness, similar to the message which was conveyed by the Turkish Cypriot leader with the acceptance of the Guterres framework. In the interview that follows, the Head of the Cypriot Problem Office of the C.C. of AKEL and member of the Support Group to the Negotiator also explains why the flirt with solutions outside the agreed framework of bizonal bicommunal federation must be immediately and decisively addressed.
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There is only one Guterres framework, but are there ultimately many interpretations?
TT: There is only one framework and it had been submitted on 30th June. It had been outlined orally by the UN Secretary-General himself inside the Conference. The Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on Cyprus Mr. Eide recorded it and handed it to all the sides. There were disagreements in relation to what the UN SG actually said. For that reason, as the President of the Republic and the negotiator informed us, after a telephone conversation between Mr. Eide and UNSG Mr. Guterres, clarifications were made which were recorded by them in an informal document drawn up on 4th July. Consequently, there is just one framework, the one that had been submitted on 30 June.
Will the Guterres framework constitute the basis for the next step on the Cyprus problem? Will there indeed be a next step?
TT: The UN Secretary-General sets out specific preconditions for a next step to exist. These preconditions are well known. He records them in the Report he submitted on 17th September and he clearly insists on them.
The UN SG is calling for a meaningful negotiating procedure, as he says. He wants the negotiations to continue from where they had remained at Crans Montana, which means with the convergences that have been achieved over this whole period, with the framework of the Secretary-General, obviously, and with the Implementation Mechanism – namely the informal document he had submitted on the last night of the talks.
He will also obviously mean in the form the negotiations were being conducted at Crans Montana. That is to say, there will be two tables. On one table, in the form of a conference, issues related to security, guarantees and troops will be discussed and on the second table issues related to the internals aspects will be the subject of discussion. The discussion is a cross-process negotiation as he himself calls it, obviously of the six main pending issues, which he also defines. This is the way the Secretary-General proposes.
However, the two leaders still have to reply…
TT: The Secretary-General was not convinced that either one or the other leader was ready to proceed in that way. On the one hand Mr. Akinci demanded a procedure with timetables – indeed in some cases the Turkish Cypriot side was demanding – that if the procedure didn’t reach a conclusion, it wanted the status of the Turkish Cypriots to be determined afterwards, which naturally is inconceivable to be accepted.
The President of the Republic has also set various demands. The latest was that he wanted to start the procedure with the discussion of the internal aspects in Cyprus and then we would see where we would be going.
In short, none of the two leaders convinced the UN Secretary-General that he was ready to proceed in the way he himself wanted, that is until the Akinci statement was made. Whatever we may say, Akinci’s statement is apparently perceived by the United Nations as a unilateral acceptance of the continuation of the procedure as proposed by the Secretary-General.
That’s precisely where the interpretations and misinterpretations started, about one or two documents…
TT: There’s been a lot of fuss about the fact that Akinci is invoking the 30th June document. I have explained to you that there’s only one document. The Secretary-General is invoking the same date in his own report. The President of the Republic is also invoking the same date in various representations he had made.
The President, in his initial reaction, didn’t send out a clear message that he himself is prepared to proceed in the way suggested by the Secretary-General. He was asking for clarifications with regards Akinci’s and Turkey’s positions on the issues of interest to us and so on. This harbors dangers because the impression of the Secretary General and, more generally, of the international community, as well as the conclusions of the EU Council on Turkey and from the statements made by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, and other officials, is different from that of the President of the Republic. They believe that Turkey had cooperated at Crans Montana on the issues of security and guarantees – and that’s precisely the reason why the Secretary-General says we were very close – and he apportioned the responsibility for the breakdown on the two leaders.
And if we were to continue on this way, as we are now, I am very afraid that eventually the sole responsibility will be assigned only our side. And, of course, the most important thing is that the talks won’t be able to resume, which is the pressing need. Therefore, a clear statement by the President, similar to that made by Akinci, is needed.
The Foreign Minister Mr. Christodoulides said that the Greek Cypriot side no longer insists on a discussion of the internal aspects of the Cyprus problem…
TT: I take note of the Foreign Ministry’s statement, which has not yet been expressed as an official reaction to Mr. Akinci’s position, that we are no longer insisting on a discussion of the internal aspects before proceeding to the next steps. This position, provided that it is adopted as the official position, gives hope that with the descent of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, it will at long last be possible to set in motion the resumption of the procedure. But this is a hypothesis. It remains to be seen in practice how things will develop.
Hasn’t the momentum created by Mustafa Akinci’s acceptance of the Guterres framework been lost?
TT: As I have already said, what the Greek Cypriot side should have done on its part was to immediately react in the direction I have outlined before. We didn’t do so. We are now waiting for the Secretary-General’s representative to clarify the situation so that we can see whether we will be able to proceed. However, what is certain is that if the two leaders don’t ask for it together – this is what the UN Secretary-General is calling for – we cannot move forward.
By saying all this, I want to make it clear that we are not expecting any spectacular development to occur before the elections in Turkey. However, this doesn’t mean that until then we must sit with our hands crossed. If from there onwards Turkey does not cooperate, it will be the one that will bear the responsibility. We have every interest in moving forward and demonstrating in practice that we are ready to engage in a resumption of the negotiation procedure, on the basis, of course, of the framework submitted by the UN Secretary-General.
How will the speeding up of the elections in Turkey affect the Cyprus problem?
TT: This issue is not unambiguous. Instead of the Greek Cypriot side waiting for another year and a half or more and to be saying that if elections don’t take place in Turkey, nothing will happen on the Cyprus problem, perhaps it is better that they are being brought forward so that we’ll know where we are heading towards.
Do you mean that perhaps more time can be created to be made use of?
TT: It means that after the elections in Turkey, maybe it will be easier to clarify matters as regards its stand and real intentions. But I repeat, the period up to the elections in Turkey must utilized.
“The danger of a two-state solution has never been more visible”
AKEL is more and more often denouncing that certain forces and circles within the Greek Cypriot community have begun to flirt with the idea of a two-state solution. How visible is this danger?
TT: It maybe be even more visible than it has ever been. The reason is this: Each time there was a stalemate in negotiations, each time a negotiation procedure collapsed – and especially during times when the United Nations was not assigning the sole responsibility on the Turkish Cypriot side and Ankara – we witnessed the most serious fait accompli. As a consequence the illegal pseudo-state was declared, so we had the official turn of the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey towards confederation. That’s when we had the intense efforts after the referendums of 2004 for direct trade of the pseudo-state with the outside world.
Now we must be even more concerned because it’s not simply the fact that no responsibilities are being assigned on the other side. Turkey is being praised for its stand at the Crans Montana conference. After Akinci’s move, he probably will also not be assigned any responsibilities. This is precisely the great danger for new serious fait accomplis being promoted. We have already had I believe the biggest provocation carried out by Turkey since the invasion of 1974 to date. I am referring to the obstruction of the Italian energy company ENI to proceed to drilling within our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and indeed in an area that Turkey does not claim for itself. It has of course no right to claim any area (in our EEZ), but this is an area it does not claim.
These dangers do exist and we must realize that partition is not a solution. Partition is the beginning of new woes and suffering. Partition, apart from all the other dangers, means surrendering 40% of Cyprus’ territory to Turkey. It means ceding more than 60% of our Exclusive Economic Zone. Consequently, this flirtation with solutions outside the agreed framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation, regardless of the disguise this may assume – either by expressing direct support of partition or by supporting positions that are unfeasible –which all they lead to is to drive developments increasingly towards final partition – must be immediately and decisively countered..