The recent interview of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on Cyprus Mr.Eide, Mr. Anastasiades’ fierce public attack on Mr. Eide himself and his subsequent threat to publish an extract from the Greek Cypriot side’s notes/minutes, had marked last week’s developments.
Developments in general following the collapse of the Crans Montana talks we believe permit us to note the following conclusions:
First: The different narrative of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on Cyprus to Nikos Anastasiades’ version as to what happened in the decisive for Cyprus’ future evening of 6th July is more than obvious. If UN SG Mr. Guterres does not summon and call Mr. Eide to order, but on the contrary continues to express his full support of him, when the latter has invoked the United Nations Secretary-General to substantiate his own position, then things are becoming worse for our side. The public attack launched by Mr. Anastasiades on the UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisor and his thoughtless reaction in favor of making public minutes merely deteriorated the impression that our side is on a collision course with the UN.
Second: This is the first time in the history of the Cyprus problem in which through Mr. Eide, as well as in the framework tabled by UN SG Guterres, the United Nations have presented in public as their position the need for the immediate abolition of the system of guarantees and rights of intervention. This is particularly important for Cyprus and the prospect of the liberation and reunification of our homeland. Also important was Mr. Guterres’ position on the need for Cyprus to become a normal state. But as positive as it is as regards the issue of security, the United Nation’s attitude is by the same token paradoxical when it defends Turkey’s intentions as sincere and vice versa, when it directly challenges Mr. Anastasiades.
Third: Even more paradoxical is the stand adopted by the UN and its representatives when instead of presenting themselves as intensely annoyed, if not angry with Turkey’s completely intransigent position on the issue of security, they are the ones defending Turkey’s intentions in public.
So why does the UN cover up Turkish intransigence when, according to our own narrative, the Turkish side:
- Was from the beginning to the end adamant on the guarantees, rights of intervention and the occupying army remaining?
- Was from beginning till the end in direct conflict with the Guterres framework?
- Misled the UN Secretary-General himself, given that, as soon as he orally presented at the negotiating table Turkish Foreign Minister Cavousoglou’s commitments for an immediate abolition of guarantees and rights of intervention, the latter categorically refuted him?
- Instead of responding to Mr. Anastasiades’ compromise proposal, as the UN had expected him to do, it responded with complete intransigence?
Fourth: The UN’s likely persistence on this highly paradoxical stand and narrative will have extremely negative ramifications for Cyprus. More specifically:
- The hitherto public stand of equal distancing vis-à-vis the parties, possibly at a later stage to be replaced by apportioning responsibilities on the Greek Cypriot side.
- Consequently, even in the best case equal-distancing scenario, no pressure will be put on Turkey to change its stand, given that not only is it not apportioning any responsibility on Turkey, but on the contrary its strong commitment to the procedure is acknowledged.
- Correspondingly, our side’s effectiveness in dealing with new fait accompli or adventurist actions by Ankara on the Cyprus problem or in the Exclusive Economic Zone is seriously eroded; fait accompli that have already been identified and which have begun to be announced.
Fifth: Given the UN’s stand towards Turkey so far, our side must take advantage of the UN’s correct positions on security and guarantees, seeking on the one hand to maintain the acquis of the negotiations.
On the other hand, given that Mr. Eide claims what he claims about Turkey’s intentions, but also since Turkey did not do the expected, it should dispel him as regards to what Turkey itself accepted, at least in public, then our side has every reason to assert the immediate continuation of the negotiation procedure since two things can happen.
Firstly, through our side’s correct handlings this time, Turkey’s intentions on security should be made use of if they really do exist, as Mr. Eide insists.
Secondly, what up until now paradoxically only our own side is invoking and which has always been the main reason for the non-solution of the Cyprus problem should be revealed to the international community. That is to say, Turkish intransigence.
Article by Yiorgos Loucaides, member of the Political Bureau of AKEL