Introduction by the General Secretary of the C.C. of AKEL A.Kyprianou in the discussion on the theme:
“The Federal Solution of the Cyprus problem: European ramifications”
Saturday, 4th May 2019, Nicosia
The initiative we have taken as AKEL to hold today’s event stems from our deep concern about the future of our country and people. Unfortunately, bearing today’s given situation in mind, the prospect of a solution of the Cyprus problem, for liberation and reunification, is becoming increasingly distant. Approximately two years have gone by since the collapse of the Crans Montana conference and it still hasn’t been possible to resume the negotiation procedure.
This is particularly worrying because there is no other way to solve the Cyprus problem other than through intercommunal talks on the internal aspects and the convening of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations to solve the external aspects of the problem. Your presence here is interpreted also as an expression of your own concern about our country’s future and prospect.
In his recent Report, the UN Secretary General Mr. Guterres stresses yet again that the period of endless talks is definitely a thing of the past. He underlines that the status quo is not a viable option. This is a warning sent out in every direction that under no circumstances will the present state of affairs remain unaltered. We all know – or ought to understand – where developments will lead to if there is no resumption of negotiations. We will be led to a definitive partition, and not to the solution of a unitary state as certain forces and circles are dreaming of.
Furthermore, the UN Secretary General says that the terms of reference must be agreed in order to create preconditions for a resumption of the talks. He admits, however, that his expectations for meeting them are low. He explains purposely that for substantial progress to be recorded, the parties need to work together having a specific target and with determination to reach a solution in the foreseeable future.
It is evident that with the fruitless search for terms of reference we have entered into an unnecessary adventure with an uncertain outcome. There was no such issue after the break down at Crans Montana. The UN Secretary General had proposed a specific and very clear course, both as regards the substance and the procedure. Namely, after a period of reflection, a continuation of the talks from where they had remained at Crans Montana on the basis of the convergences agreed, the Guterres Framework and the informal document on the mechanism for implementing the solution. And of course the discussion of the internal and external aspects of the Cyprus problem at two separate tables with a different composition.
The reality is that in the almost two years that have elapsed, Mr. Guterres never got a clear answer on this issue. On the contrary, so-called “new ideas” (tabled by President Anastasiades) have intruded.
Initially, Mr. Anastasiades proposed decentralized federation, without explaining what he precisely means to this day. This issue has to do with federal competences. At Crans Montana they were almost fully agreed. For this reason, the Secretary General of the UN did not include them in his Framework of 6 points.
Subsequently, the President reopened the issue of political equality and effective participation, openly questioning the convergence for a Turkish Cypriot positive vote in Cabinet decisions. Mr. Guterres himself, in his Report submitted in September 2017, states that the question of effective participation was essentially resolved. We note, of course, that the one positive vote concerns the Cabinet, but not all the bodies dealing with low political issues as the Turkish Cypriot side was demanding. This was also rejected by the UN Secretary General himself in his Framework.
Lastly, the President belatedly called for the replacement of the convergence agreed for a presidential system with a parliamentary system, which had already been discussed and rejected at the talks.
As a result, all these ideas are outside the Framework of the UN Secretary-General, which Mr. Anastasiades otherwise claims to accept. It is no accident that Mr. Guterres points out in his latest Report that although everyone declares that they adopt the Framework, at the same time the procedure isn’t moving forward. It is clear that the path chosen by Mr. Anastasiades does not lead to a conclusion on the terms of reference and, therefore, to the resumption of talks. Nor does it even lead to putting the Turkish side in a corner.
The UN Secretary General in his latest Report felt the need to remind that for decades the Security Council remains committed to a solution of bi-communal, bizonal federation. However, he also felt the need to make it clear that his Framework, with its six points, meets this strategic goal. The endless discussions of the past whether we should negotiate a bicommunal, bizonal federal solution or, whether openly or indirectly, we should be seeking a solution of a unitary state, must finally stop. At least, as far as those who well-meaningly believed there was an alternative to the dilemma ‘federation or partition’.
It is now more than clear that all the discussions, even in upper echelons of power, for the abandonment of the goal for bi-communal, bizonal federation, are directed squarely towards partition and not towards a unitary state.
The argument is often put forward by the opponents of the federal solution that it will not be viable if one considers what followed the Zurich-London agreements. But is such a comparison correct? We should recall that the talks at Crans Montana regarding the international aspects of the Cyprus problem remained at the point where the termination of the Treaty of Guarantee and any intervention rights from the first day of the solution was demanded from Turkey, as well as the speedy and timely withdrawal of the occupying troops. The termination of the Treaty of Guarantee by itself constitutes a significant improvement. Furthermore, the Treaty of Alliance, even in the worst case scenario for us for a Treaty of an indefinite period, will be turned into a fixed time period, which also represents a significant improvement.
Lastly, the Treaty of Establishment which concerns the bases will on the one hand remain in place, but we all know that Britain reaffirms its commitment to returning half the territories of the bases with the signing of the solution. No one excludes afterwards the beginning of a struggle for the complete withdrawal of the British bases from the island.
Regarding the internal aspects of the Cyprus problem, the President and Vice-President will be elected by cross-voting, rather than separately by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The rigid veto of the 1960 Constitution will be ended and be replaced by a positive vote in the Council of Ministers where there will be a 7: 4 ratio. Separate majorities on specific issues in Parliament will be replaced by qualified majority votes roughly around them. Whilst the 1960 Constitution does not include mechanisms to overcome deadlocks, there are already convergences recorded for the institutionalization of such mechanisms that will ensure that no deadlocks will arise.
As to all these issues, we must add the factor of the European Union, which will constitute another safeguard, given that it will inject bicommunalism and bizonalism with the transfer of competences to European institutions. The status of a member state, apart from the fact that it will be explicitly referred in the Agreement, will minimize the possibilities for secession, since such efforts will be in direct conflict with the European acquis. The recent example of Spain says a lot about the European Union’s stance on such issues. Indeed, the participation of the Federal Republic in the European Union can provide institutional tools for the protection of the constitutional order which are triggered by the Constitution itself and not by decisions of third parties. For example, Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, which provides for sanctions, can be used as a credible deterrent against both secession, as well as the capture of the state by one community. The fact that there are such tools and capabilities demonstrates that those who do not want to use such tools and are insisting on looking towards NATO suffer from extreme dogmatism. Let alone that the statute of NATO forbids its intervention to resolve disputes between its allies. The example of Greece and Turkey is a very clear case in point.
After decades of talks, we all know where one side can meet with the other, with what compromises we can live with and with what compromises we cant.
Everyone involved with the Cyprus problem knows that where there is genuine political will, there are solutions too. We have agreed many and important convergences, functional and workable. At Crans Montana we had reached within a whisker from the solution of core pending issues. Continuous and maximalist regressions, wherever they may come from, are increasingly distancing the prospect of a solution. Time is running out. Turkey’s suffocating embrace of the Turkish Cypriot community and the consolidation of the fait accomplis on the ground confirm that the nightmare of the final partition is looming more threateningly than ever over Cyprus.
In addition to all of these, we must also add Turkey’s recent action to notify its intention towards the United Nations for the beginning of drillings within the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus. Needless to say, if Turkey does carry out its threats, it will constitute a flagrant violation of the UN Law of the Sea. However, it is clear that only through the solution of the Cyprus problem will we be able to address Turkish aggression effectively.
We have always said what Mr. Guterres also concludes in his Report, namely that the natural resources must benefit both communities; that they can be a powerful incentive for a viable solution of the Cyprus problem. The tripartite meetings on energy issues, which at some point must be given a purpose and an object, must also be addressed from precisely this point of view.
Before I finish, I would like to say two words about the accusation being made by the Government and others against AKEL, that we are supposedly adopting Turkish positions or that we are facilitating Turkey in the promotion of its plans.
We do not adopt Turkish positions at all. Do those accusing us hear what the UN says, the EU or even Cyprus’ good friends internationally? Nobody adopts Mr. Anastasiades’ narrative.
It does not serve purpose to bury our head in the sand.
Those who leave Turkey off the hook and immune and facilitate its plans are the ones who pretend that they don’t understand what the Reports of the UN Secretary General say, which they have never questioned.
Μaximalisms in politics, let alone as regards the management of the future of an entire country, have been tested in the past and have determined in the worst way the course of our country.
Those forces and circles who have the naivety to believe that with their handlings they will manage developments in the wider region and will put Turkey on the sidelines of the geostrategic arena, will undeniably have to learn from the history of international relations and especially of our country.
We should, here and now, reach a conclusion on the notorious terms of reference and return to the negotiations from the point where we had remained at Crans Montana.
Otherwise, the nightmare of the final partition will become a reality, painful and unbearable for the shoulders of any leadership.